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Abstract 
This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and Brundrit, based on 
classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga and Vilenkin, based on the DH 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, both of which conclude that, in an infinite 
universe, planets and living beings must be repeated an infinite number of times. 
We point to some possible shortcomings in the arguments of these authors. We 
conclude that the idea of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be 
considered strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and cosmology. Such 
ideas should be seen rather as examples of «ironic science» in the terminology of 
John Horgan. 
1. Introduction 
The notion that events and series of events make history happen once and again in an 
infinite repetition is very old. In the West it is at least as old as philosophy1 and it can also 
be found in even older traditions of mythic thought2. 
These repetitions are usually presented as recurrences in time, not in space. This is self-
explaining, for it is modern astronomy which has first opened the possibility of considering 
planet Earth as a non-unique object, as the representative of a class, possibly large, of life-
sustaining planets. 
Fantastic literature goes usually before speculative science. Thus, the idea that the universe 
is repetitive (in both spatial and temporal senses), that the same situations repeat once and 
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again, appears first in narrations such as La biblioteca de Babel, by Borges3. In this story, 
Borges describes a library, a clear image of the universe, which contains all the possible 
books, even those which are made of meaningless character strings. Every book contains 
exactly 1,312,000 characters. For every particular book, the library contains over 30 million 
almost identical copies which differ in just one character (they can be considered as copies 
with a single errata); almost one quadrillion copies differing in two characters; and so forth. 
In addition, the library also contains the translation of every book to all the tongues, actual 
or just possible. However, both the library and the number of books it contains are not 
infinite. If the library were infinite (Borges suggests this possibility at the end of the story) 
each book would be represented by an infinite number of copies. 
Up to now, these ideas could seem appropriate only for mythology and fantastic literature. 
But recently a new possibility has risen: that they can be derived from physical theories 
about the universe. Soon after the big-bang cosmology was established as the standard 
cosmological model, some arguments were offered which, starting from apparently 
plausible assumptions, seem to bring us to the scenario of a universe of histories which 
repeat infinitely in space. 
The objectives of this paper are: (1) summarize the two main argumentations that end in 
this conclusion; (2) criticize some possible errors in those argumentations; (3) discuss the 
controversial philosophical concept implicit in both: the actual possibility of an infinite 
universe; and (4) signal the difference between the highly conjectural character of the 
argumentations discussed here and the way in which they are frequently described in 
popular science magazines and books. 
To fulfill these goals, the remainder of this article is divided thus: sections two and three 
describe the two most representative argumentations among those that lead to a universe 
with an infinite number of histories that repeat in space: the argumentation by Ellis and 
Brundrit, and the argumentation by Garriga and Vilenkin. Sections four and five point out 
the possible shortcomings in those argumentations. The sixth section discusses the 
controversial character of the infinite universe. And the seventh compares the result of this 
analysis with the way in which those speculations are presented in the popular science 
media. 
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 2. The Ellis-Brundrit (E-B) argumentation  
The argumentation proposed by Ellis and Brundrit4 starts from classic relativistic physics 
and the hypothesis that the universe is spatially infinite and homogeneous, and develops as 
follows: 
1. The number of galaxies and planets in an infinite homogeneous universe is infinite. 
2. The number of possible history lines in the configuration space of that universe is also 
infinite.  
3. Among those history lines, a few could give room to the emergence of living beings 
based on DNA on the surface of a planet. The number of line histories compatible 
with life must be at least one, since we are here. 
4. If the probability of DNA-based life should be greater than zero, an infinite universe 
will contain an infinite number of living beings of this type. To explain why this 
probability may be greater than zero, they claim the following: 
«We assume that this is a stable property, that is, the probability remains finite [they 
mean non-zero] for a small range of conditions different from those holding in our 
own vicinity in the universe (e.g. a small change in average temperature or average 
matter-density would not reduce this probability to zero»5. 
What they mean is that different but similar history lines would end in the same or 
similar results.  
5. The number of possible DNA-based living beings is finite, because the size of the 
DNA molecules cannot be arbitrarily large. 
6. Therefore an infinite universe will contain an infinite number of copies of every 
possible living being. Applying the same reasoning a further step, since the possible 
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material combinations on a planet are also finite, we’ll conclude that the universe will 
contain an infinity of planets identical to Earth, including all the living beings on it. 
7. Therefore we live in a universe where events and histories are repeated in an infinity of 
places. The authors explain it thus: 
a. «...with an infinite number of histories to look at, it is difficult to provide an 
argument why a particular history should occur only once»6. 
b. «If initial conditions are such that the probability of any event occurring is non-
vanishing, then we expect that event to occur in infinitely many planetary 
systems»7. 
 
3. The Garriga-Vilenkin (G-V) argumentation 
In their paper «Many worlds in one»8 Garriga and Vilenkin propose a different scenario, 
based on the decoherent histories (DH) interpretation of quantum mechanics9. Their 
argumentation develops in the following way: 
1. They assume that the universe (or the inflationary multiverse, which appears to be their 
preferred option) is spatially infinite and homogeneous. That universe (or multiverse) 
can be divided into an infinity of causally disconnected regions (O-regions) defined by 
event horizons. 
2. They assume that space is quantifiable, so that every O-region can be divided in a finite 
number of cells. 
3. In addition, they assume that this quantification is correctly described by the DH 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
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4. If the energy in every O-region is finite, since energy is quantified, it would be possible 
to divide its range of variation into a finite number of bins; therefore the number of 
possible histories in an O-region would be finite. In those environments where planets 
and life can exist, such as Earth, energy can be considered finite, since we are far from 
gravity singularities. This means that gravity can be ruled out of this argumentation. 
5. Therefore, given that by hypothesis there is an infinite number of O-regions and the 
number of possible histories in each region is finite, every history must be repeated an 
infinite number of times in the universe. 
 
4. A critic to the Ellis-Brundrit (E-B) scenario 
We first discuss the E-B reasoning. 
1. Step 1 in the E-B argumentation states that an infinite homogeneous universe will 
contain an infinity of galaxies and planets. This is correct. As these entities are 
countable, that infinity would be ℵ-0 (the number of natural numbers). 
2. On the other hand, the number of history lines mentioned in step 2 is not 
countable. In a classic universe with a continuous non-quantified space, which they 
are considering, that number would be the number of lines that could be drawn in 
the infinite volume of the configuration space defined by all the independent 
parameters of the universe. That infinity is greater than ℵ-0, and also greater than 
the continuum. 
3. Step 3 is correct. 
4. To estimate the probability of the emergence of living beings, according to step 4, it 
would be necessary to estimate the number of history lines that make this 
emergence possible. Since the total number of lines is infinite (this is an E-B 
hypothesis), for that probability to be greater than zero, the number of histories 
compatible with life should be infinite. 
As E-B correctly indicate in a endnote, from our existence it cannot be deduced 
that the probability is greater than zero. We must add that the same would happen 
even if we had a finite number of positive cases of life in other planets. To achieve 
an infinite number of histories, they assume that all the lines in a range around ours 
(which did produce life) in the configuration space would give rise to the same or a 
very similar result. If the radius of that range were greater than zero, the number of 
history lines inside the range would be infinite. 
5. For the time being, we accept step 5.  
6. If all the previous steps were correct, steps 6 and 7 (the E-B conclusion) would 
follow correctly from the premises. The 7.b quotation summarizes the conclusion. 
The 7.a quotation, however, is not valid. It should say just the opposite: ...with an 
infinite number of histories to look at, it is difficult to provide an argument why a particular 
history should occur more than once. This is so, because the infinity of lines is much larger 
than the infinity of living beings (which is ℵ-0), therefore each planet compatible 
with life could be associated to a different history, even if their number were 
infinite. 
In our opinion, the most dubious step in this development is step 4. Is it true that by 
considering almost-identical histories we attain a probability greater than zero of the 
emergence of DNA-based living beings, as E-B affirm? 
This assertion can be refuted in two ways: 
1. Refutation based on the probability that two beings/planets have very similar histories. 
 
a. A history line in our universe just now (ours, for instance) is a curve in the 
configuration space of the universe (which is infinite by hypothesis) with a length 
of 13,700 million years (since the big bang to our days). 
b. We will call a history line g almost equal to another history line h when all the points 
in g are located inside a cylinder with a finite radius E, built around the points of h. 
c. Consider two planets, A and B. Let h be the history line of A. Which is the 
probability that g (the history line of B) is almost equal to h? 
d. Although given h there is an infinity of g curves g that comply with the definition, 
that probability is the quotient the volume (in the configuration space) occupied by 
all the curves complying with the definition, divided by the volume occupied by all 
the curves. The former is the volume of a cylinder with radius E and a length of 
13,700 million years, which is finite. The second is infinite (we have assumed that 
the configuration space is infinite). Ergo the probability that two planets A and B 
have almost equal curves is zero. This does not preclude e.g. that there are some 
living planets apart from the Earth, but their number need not be infinite. 
 
2. Refutation based on the chaotic character of the expansive universe. 
 
a. The uncertainty principle sets a minimum difference for the initial conditions of 
two different history lines. 
b. The equations of classical relativistic physics (those used by E-B) are chaotic. 
c. Therefore two different history lines, which at the beginning differ at least in the 
limits set by the uncertainty principle, must separate arbitrarily along their history, 
according with the definition of chaotic functions. This is even more true because 
the universe expands. 
d. Therefore there are no two almost equal history lines. 
 
Would this argumentation be affected if the universe contained attractors where the 
history lines would converge? Those attractors could be: 
a) Sinks (black holes). They are incompatible with life. 
b) Cycles. They don’t seem to exist in the universe. Perhaps they are incompatible 
with an expanding universe. 
c) Saddles. They are unstable and sooner or later the history lines converging there 
would get apart in opposite directions. 
d) Strange attractors. Those history lines attracted by them would get very near to the 
attractor, but not to one another, for given a point in one, the next point would 
have an unpredictable position. Ergo two history lines attracted by the same strange 
attractor would be very different, even though superficially similar. 
We don’t know if the universe contains strange attractors, they may be 
incompatible with its expansion. On the other hand, if there are, they may be 
incompatible with life. In that case, as the E-B argumentation refers to living being 
histories, they should be excluded. 
This argumentation is valid for sufficiently long sections of history lines, even though 
they do not start at the big bang.  
In summary, the Ellis-Brundrit argumentation cannot stand as formulated in their original 
paper. This result is important, as it gainsays the intuitive and well-known idea that in an 
infinite universe all the histories must be repeated automatically, including those of living 
beings on the Earth10. Actually, the repetition of histories is avoided because the infinite of 
possible histories is larger than the infinite of objects (galaxies, planets) in an infinite 
universe. Therefore, for their argumentation about the repetition of the histories of living 
beings on the Earth to be valid, Ellis and Brundrit would need to prove that the number of 
histories leading to life is not concentrated in a finite volume in configuration space, or 
alternatively they would have to assert that the configuration space is finite. But then they 
would need to change their model of the universe, possibly going to a quantum model 
similar to that proposed by Garriga and Vilenkin. 
 
5. A critic to the Garriga-Vilenkin (G-V) scenario  
This argumentation is based on a set of currently questionable hypotheses. Therefore, their 
credibility is very low (because of the strong increase of uncertainty in a cascade of 
hypotheses). For instance: 
1. It starts by assuming an infinite space, which is currently conjectural. We’ll come back 
to this in the next section. 
2. Space is assumed to be quantified and quantum theory is applied to cosmology. This is 
just another conjecture. Even more, all the attempts which have been done in past 
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decades to find an indication of the quantum character of space and gravity have given 
a negative result11. 
3. Their quantification is based in the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics. This 
interpretation has been the object of strong critics, and is far from being the standard 
interpretation among specialists12. 
4. The authors themselves accept that the fourth step in their argumentation (the 
inference that the total number of distinct histories is finite) is valid only in an universe 
without gravity (i.e. empty). In our universe there are situations (inside black holes or at 
the big bang) where the energy density of a single region may be infinite, but they reject 
those situations because they are far from the world of human experience. The original 
text says the following: 
«In the absence of gravity, the boundedness of physical quantities usually follows from 
the finiteness of the energy of the system. The gravitational energy is not positive-
definite,and in the presence of gravity the matter energy density can get arbitrarily large 
when it is compensated by equally large negative gravitational energy density. This 
happens, for example, during gravitational collapse in the interiors of black holes, in a 
recollapsing closed universe, and could happen in some extremely large quantum 
fluctuations. These extreme situations, however, are far removed from the low-energy 
world of the human experience, and it seems reasonable to isolate them when 
comparing the histories of different O-regions»13. 
However, this reasoning presents several problems: 
a) It cannot be denied that, for the time being, human beings do not have much to do 
with black holes. That other intelligent beings or we ourselves in the future will be 
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in the same situation seems an undue assumption. Perhaps one day we’ll be able to 
take advantage of a black hole to reach relativistic speeds, in a similar way as the 
Voyager spacecrafts used Jupiter’s gravity to accelerate themselves toward Saturn. 
In that case, we’d be extracting energy from the black hole, which would come to 
be a part of our history. 
b) But there is an additional important point that has not been considered in the G-V 
argumentation: the fact that all history lines did go once through a situation similar 
to the center of a black hole, namely the big bang. Ergo the conditions with infinite 
energy affect all the possible history lines. The number of distinct history lines may 
thus be infinite. As a result, the history lines have not to repeat themselves, even in 
an infinite universe. 
c) On the other hand, the idea that the histories of habitable regions can be described 
ignoring gravitational singularities does not take into account that these singularities 
exist inside the O-regions and clearly influence their dynamics. For instance, our 
planet rotates around the black hole in the center of the Milky Way. Therefore, our 
own history depends to a certain extent of phenomena and regions related to a 
gravitational singularity. In summary, ignoring gravity while describing the O-
regions does not seem feasible. 
 
5. Finally, the fact that the universe expands may affect drastically the G-V 
argumentation. In a stationary universe, a finite number of histories could have no 
option but repeat. In a dynamic universe, however, the number of bins in each O-
region may increase with time in such a way that histories get apart from one another 
indefinitely. This would increase the number of possible histories (perhaps without 
limit) thus preventing repetitions. Therefore the G-V argumentation cannot work 
without a proof that the number of bins relevant to building the histories is bounded in 
time in an expanding universe. And this is regardless of whether the gravitational 
singularities should be considered or not as part of the picture. G-V have not given any 
reason to suspect the existence of such a boundary, nor even signaled this difficulty. 
Every one of the ideas postulated and the argumentative options in this list is doubtful. 
And the G-V argumentation requires all of them to be correct. Therefore, the scenario 
described by these authors must be considered highly speculative, to say the least. 
 
6. The uncertain character of an infinite universe  
The analysis of the Ellis-Brundrit and Garriga-Vilenkin argumentations has made it clear 
that the idea of a spatially infinite universe must be postulated at the very beginning of this 
type of conjectures. However, if the history of physics can be used to assess the initial 
credibility of a hypothesis, the postulate of a spatially infinite universe does not seem 
particularly promising. 
Paraphrasing Aristotle, we can say that nature abhors infinity14. Along the history of physics, 
once and again situations have emerged where infinities seemed impossible to avoid. One 
after another they have fallen, and improved theories have avoided the infinites15. 
Just now we have two basic theories in physics, general relativity and quantum theory, 
which seem incompatible with one another. This makes it impossible to predict what 
happened before Planck’s time, where both should be applied at the same time. However, 
these two theories have a weak point: both predict infinities: relativity, in the gravity 
singularities (black holes and the big bang); quantum theory, in the energy of the vacuum 
and those quantities that must be renormalized in quantum field theory16. The experience 
provided by the history of physics seems to indicate that both theories could be simple 
approximations of a third more general theory, which would unify them and eliminate the 
infinities. Perhaps, when this theory is found, the cosmologic infinities may also disappear. 
However, while we wait for possible changes due to an important forward move in our 
comprehension of the physical world, it is usually claimed that the current standard 
cosmological model leaves open the possibility that the universe is infinite, since this is the 
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consequence of Einstein’s equations whenever K ≤ 0, where K defines the curvature of the 
universe in those equations. 
However, the infinitude of the universe can only be deduced in that case if an additional 
postulate is accepted, namely the so-called «cosmological principle», which asserts that the 
universe is homogeneous and isotropic at sufficiently large scales. This “principle” is 
needed to extrapolate the cosmological description of the universe beyond the boundaries 
of the observable universe. However, the justification of this principle gives rise to serious 
problems17. Therefore an agnostic position with respect to the extrapolations of the 
description of the universe beyond our horizon seems to be epistemologically reasonable, 
especially when that extrapolation goes to infinity.  
In consequence, independently of the weak points in the Ellis-Brundrit and Garriga-
Vilenkin argumentations we have signaled in the previous sections, the mere fact that both 
depend on the assumption that the universe is infinite gives them a highly speculative 
character. 
7. Theoretical and practical conclusions 
From the discussion of the Ellis-Brundrit and Garriga-Vilenkin argumentations in the 
preceding sections, it follows that the scenario of a universe where history repeats in an 
infinity of worlds spread throughout  an infinite space cannot be considered a consequence 
of current physics and cosmology. In actual fact, these scenarios remain no more than 
literary tales, although they have been presented with the terminology of modern 
cosmology. 
                                                           
17
 A comprehensive discussion of the problems raised by the justification of the «cosmological principle» 
can be found in Beisbart, C. (2009), «Can we justifiably assume the Cosmological Principle in order to 
break model underdetermination in cosmology?» Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Volume 40, 
Issue 2 (2009), 175-205. And with regard to empirical data, new structures of increasing size are found 
now and again. [See, e.g. Clowes R. et al. (2012), «A structure in the early universe at z ~ 1.3 that 
exceeds the homogeneity scale of the R-W concordance cosmology». Available at: 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1211.6256]. Is there in fact a limit to the inhomogeneity of the universe? No one 
really knows. 
This is, however, a theoretical conclusion. In practice, authors18 and popular writers usually 
present these speculations as though they were very probable, practically proved by science. 
Even technical articles contain statements expressed with surprising certainty. For instance, 
in «Many worlds in one» Garriga and Vilenkin state: 
«The argument below is far from being a rigorous proof of these statements, but we do 
believe that it makes them rather plausible»19 
«Rather plausible»? This surprising certainty becomes temerity when we go from the 
technical articles to popularizing books. For instance, in a recent book of this character, 
with the same title as the article discussed here, Alex Vilenkin states: 
«We arrive at the inevitable conclusion that every single history should be repeated an 
infinite number of times. [...] And any history that has a nonzero probability will happen 
−or has happened: in an infinite number of O-regions!»20 
«Inevitable conclusion»? Perhaps the only inevitable conclusion of this is the fact that at 
least some of the supposedly scientific cosmological scenarios currently popularized are 
actually good samples of «ironic science», −using John Horgan’s terminology−, that is: 
«[...] opinions -which are at best "interesting" and provoke further comment. But it does 
not converge on the truth. It cannot achieve empirically verifiable "surprises" that force 
scientists to make substantial revisions in their basic description of reality»21. 
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